Wing Thye Woo: "Trump VS The World: Who Will Win?"

Awani International, the international affairs news service under Malaysia’s leading news network Astro Awani. On 14 May 2025, Awani International inaugurated a weekly discussion between Professor Wing Thye Woo (University Chair Professor at Liaoning University, China, and Distinguished Professor Emeritus at University of California Davis, USA) and Ms. Melisa Idris (Senior News Editor at Awani International). Woo.Says is the name of this new weekly discussion series, and its primary objective is to unpack the deeper dynamics and future trajectories of US-China relations and their implications for the world.

In the second episode, “Trump VS The World: Who Will Win?”, Professor Woo explores how Donald Trump’s confrontational approach to the global order is driven more by domestic political ambitions than coherent strategy. The text below is an edited summary of the interview.

Melisa Idris: This week, we take a closer look at President Trump’s mission to dismantle the current world order and what that means for the rest of us. President Trump has repeatedly stated that the global system is rigged, and he is determined to change it. He has withdrawn from trade agreements and stepped back from global climate commitments. It is clear that he envisions a new world order shaped according to his own terms. The question is: Can one individual, even someone who once hosted The Apprentice, truly reset the world order? Professor Woo, when you consider Trump’s actions in his second term as president, what do you think motivates his stance toward the world order? What has provoked such a strong reaction from him, and what specific issues does he have with how the world is currently structured?

Prof. Woo: I believe it is less a matter of disagreement with the world itself than a reflection of his desire to secure a second term in office. His actions appear driven largely by electoral motivations and a desire to consolidate domestic popularity. This ambition explains at least two of his major actions. First, he has sought to bring manufacturing jobs back to the United States, which accounts for the tariffs he has imposed. Second, in order to maintain American dominance in global affairs, he has attempted to restrict China’s access to advanced technologies.

In addition to these two actions, Trump has also reduced official aid to foreign countries. This is because he knows that many in the United States question the effectiveness of foreign aid, often perceiving limited recognition of the support provided.

Melisa Idris: When you talked about Trump wanting to “Make America Great Again,” I am wondering whether he is aiming for a return to 20th-century US hegemony. Is that even possible in a world where the global order has changed? It is no longer a unipolar world in the way Trump might imagine it. Is his vision ultimately flawed in the context of the 21st century?

Prof. Woo: At present, China’s GDP, in terms of production capacity, is equal to that of the United States. This means that China is capable of producing the same quantity of military assets, such as aircraft carriers, annually as the United States.

The key difference lies in per capita GDP. China’s per capita GDP is less than one-third of that of the United States, more accurately, closer to one-quarter. However, China’s population is more than three times larger. The gap in per capita output is primarily explained by differences in technological levels. If China continues to advance technologically, its per capita GDP will increase. Therefore, China has the potential to reach US levels, and when it does, its overall production capacity would be approximately three times larger than that of the United States.

This process of technological catching-up will be difficult to stop. First, China can continue to import advanced technologies from Europe, Japan, and South Korea.  Second, China is increasing its innovation capacity with huge investments in education and research and welcoming foreign talents, both of which improve China's ability to develop substitutes for technologies that are restricted by the US.

I had said that the United States may eventually find itself one-third the size of China in terms of production capacity.  However, this does not mean that China will become the next global hegemon, as the United Kingdom was in the 19th century or the United States in the 20th century. India is also experiencing rapid growth and is likely to equal or surpass China in size. The global landscape is not simply about the dragon replacing the eagle; it also includes the fast emergence of a large elephant. Hence, the international order will include at least two major powers.  Maintaining a unipolar world would require US to be able halt the rise of India as well.

In addition, President Trump’s recent actions have strengthened Europe’s resolve to pursue deeper integration, including the possibility of forming a common military force outside NATO. If Europe develops into the type of united entity envisioned by its founders, it would become a power comparable to the United States.

These developments make it clear that the era of global hegemony has come to an end. The diffusion of technology has transformed the world into a multipolar system.

Melisa Idris: This is very interesting. What happens when giants compete for power? When the eagle, the dragon, the tiger, and the elephant all assert themselves on the global stage, what becomes of the smaller and middle-sized countries? How can they avoid being caught in the crossfire?

Prof. Woo: Although President Trump has been promoting the idea of “America First,” and although President Biden had committed to US primacy, both know that these are campaign slogans and not realistic policy positions. Both leaders are aware that in a nuclear age, there can be no true number one. Any major conflict would result in catastrophic consequences for all. Despite the rhetoric, both US and China wish to prevent a nuclear war in which there would be no winners.

Historically, some major powers have sought to avoid conflict by informally coordinating their regional influence. For smaller states, this has often meant facing constraints in their diplomatic autonomy.

For a country like Malaysia, joining a particular sphere implies becoming part of an exclusive group under the leadership of a Big Brother. Members of that group would enjoy free trade among themselves, but access to markets outside the group could be restricted. This arrangement reduces economic wealth and compromises national sovereignty.

A better outcome would be for the middle powers to form a buffer between the great powers. This caucus of buffer states would be neutral and friendly to both US and China. If this group of middle powers possesses sufficient economic weight (large GDP and huge population), both superpowers will be compelled to treat it with respect. This arrangement would be preferable to a world strictly divided along competing spheres of influence.

Melisa Idris: You have proposed the idea of a club or caucus of buffer states—middle powers joining together to declare that they are not choosing sides. But realistically, is this achievable? What would it actually take to build such a coalition?

Prof. Woo: It is entirely possible, but the initial steps are critical. The caucus must reach a certain level of economic weight early on, so that it becomes too significant to ignore. In international affairs, neutrality is seldom achieved by a self-declaration of neutrality. The status of neutrality has to be earned by having an economic size that equals the economic size of the super powers.

For a country like Malaysia that prefers not to align with any particular power, the current debate in ASEAN over whether to negotiate bilaterally or collectively with the United States misses the central issue. Neither approach will be effective unless the United States agrees to engage on those terms. Collective bargaining is not something that already exists; it is something that must be built.

Many developing countries may instinctively consider forming a new Bandung Conference, or a Global South coalition. That is one possibility, and indeed, some political momentum seems to be moving in that direction. However, I believe that would be a mistake. There is no need to introduce a framework of class conflict into international relations. Our objective should be to preserve peace, not to extend global class struggle.

A more constructive alternative would be a North-South coalition composed of middle powers. This coalition should extend beyond ASEAN to include countries such as Japan and South Korea. The coalition should also not be based on ethnicity or geography. It would be wise to also include European middle powers that have historically maintained strong relations with the United States. The resulting neutral North-South group would resemble a functional and inclusive institution that is similar in spirit to the United Nations, rather than a bloc of poor countries demanding social justice.

The aim of the proposed North-South partnership is to maximum global prosperity. Japan and South Korea are already economically advanced, and the European Union is an established and wealthy region. If these actors come together with ASEAN, the resulting coalition would possess substantial economic influence, enough to command the attention and respect of both China and the United States.

Importantly, such a coalition would not appear to favor one side over the other. In contrast, BRICS has taken positions on certain issues that may be interpreted by some observers as more aligned with China and Russia, although its members emphasize inclusive cooperation. Instead of forming a Global South alliance that could unintentionally promote international class-based divisions, we should work towards creating quickly a large, balanced, and inclusive coalition—something closer to an expanded and reimagined United Nations.

Melisa Idris: If we do manage to build this caucus of buffer states, what kind of world order would we be stepping into? Is there any silver lining to the global turbulence that has been triggered by President Trump’s vision?

Prof. Woo: The United States will eventually return to the global order, primarily because climate change and biodiversity loss pose a direct threat to our collective survival. The destruction of biodiversity leads to the collapse of the food chain, and when that happens, even those who sit at the top of the hierarchy will be the first to be affected. For this reason, out of rational self-interest, the United States will ultimately re-engage with the rest of the world. However, the return of the US to the family of nations will take time, possibly as long as ten years.

It is likely that only when the current populist coalition fails to fulfil its promises will a more enlightened group of American leaders be able to take its place and guide the country back into constructive global participation.

In the meantime, other countries must take proactive steps. We should maintain free trade among those willing to participate. We must also continue working on essential global missions such as pandemic response, biodiversity protection, and climate action. A peace-oriented caucus is needed — one that does not take sides, but instead offers thoughtful proposals to help the major powers overcome their mutual distrust.

Additionally, this caucus of North-South middle powers should include a development agency. Wealthier member states should assist poorer ones in achieving development. This proposed caucus should rest on three core pillars. The first is economic, focused on defending and sustaining the global trade system. The second is political, aimed at peacekeeping and cooperation in addressing shared global challenges. The third is moral, centred on supporting the development of less advanced members, and giving them the option to opt out of Cold War 2.0.

Melisa Idris: Thank you very much, Professor Woo, for helping us unpack the complexities of the shifting global order.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of the publication. For access to the original link, please contact us: international@lnu.edu.cn.