Liu Xu

                                                                        School of International Economics and International Relations

Abstract: Carbon tariffs for a country to protect the environment in dealing with the crisis of global warming on the grounds, a special additional levy on the basis of the general tariff on exports of high energy consumption of the country with no greenhouse gas emission and limits of environmental taxes reduction This hinders his country's products entering the domestic market, so as to achieve the purpose to protect the domestic market. It was first proposed by former French President Jacques Chirac, the intention was to hope that EU nations should be levied for failure to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, "the State of imports of goods, tax, and its essence is a green tariff, is a broad technical trade barrier. "Carbon tariff" is deeply rooted in the European Union and the United States was once extremely popular "carbon politics" concept and "low-carbon and political" ideology itself is in fact in the context of the international climate change, a carbon emissions the political and economic game means, especially in the trend of the global economic downturn of the post-financial crisis era and the era of European debt crisis has been widely applied to the respective national development strategies and national interests. In essence, carbon tariffs are an international political and economic problem, which is hidden behind the complexity of the strategic interests of the game. This paper first analyzes the social basis of the formation of carbon tariffs as well as the political foundation as well as the economic and technological basis, and then put forward the relevant legal basis, "carbon tariff" and "low-carbon economy" as the starting point from the game between the developed countries, developing cooperation between the countries with interest demands, as well as between China, U.S., EU and other countries at all levels of intense game and competition in the analysis. It mainly based on the theory of public choice theory in international relations theory and international mechanisms as the theoretical basis, the use of game theory, in-depth analysis of the different positions of the above game dominated by the parties in the different carbon political philosophy for a "carbon tariff" and "low-carbon economy" profoundly reveals the game parties in a "carbon tariff" behind the evolution of complex national interests. Finally, of the end-result will be back to the collection of "carbon tariffs" may bring to China's impacts, and proposed response strategies. The purpose is to expect to solve the global warming caused by a series of international interests of the game an effective way, and ultimately find out a new pathway for China's own low-carbon economic development, in the increasingly fierce international "carbon tariff" game, to the greatest degree of safeguarding national interests.

Read the full article here:       基于碳关税理念的国家利益博弈研究.pdf